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argument against such an extension was rejected. 52  Likewise, the
presence of a compensation fund for prisoners was held not
necessarily to preclude prisoner suits under the FTCA.53  The
Court found the compensation scheme to be non-comprehensive.5 4
The government's contention that variations in state laws might
hamper uniform administration of federal prisons, as it was feared
they would with the military, was rejected. Admitting that prisoner
recoveries might be prejudiced to some extent by variations in
state law, the Court regarded no recovery at all as a more serious
prejudice to the prisoner's rights.55  In this connection, it is
interesting to consider the desirability of spreading tort liability
in the governmental area.5"
The impact of the principal case is, in some respects, clear.
It sets to rest a controversy that has been present in the federal
courts since the passage of the FTCA in 1946. It strengthens
the prospects of compliance with the standards of care owed by the
Bureau of Prisons to federal prisoners,57 and provides them with
much needed relief.58
The holding that prisoners can sue the government may,
indeed, prove to be the catalyst necessary for added wai- ers of
sovereign immunity on the part of the state. Finally, the
unanimity of the Court's decision indicates its firm determination
to liberally construe the FTCA, a trend begun by the Indian
Towing Co. and Rayonier cases.
WILLS - DECEASED RESIDUARY LEGATEE'S SHARE HELD NOT
TO PASS BY WAY OF INTESTACY WHERE IT IS CLEARLY MANIFESTED
THAT SURVIVING RESIDUARY LEGATEES SHOULD SHARE IN THE
RESIDUUM- In this proceeding the petitioner requested the Court
52 United States v. Muniz, supra note 48, at 159.
53 Id. at 160.
54 Ibid. Only those federal prisoners engaged in Federal Prison In-
dustries (18% of all federal prisoners) were coyered by this prison com-
pensation scheme. Woody, Recovery by Federal Prisoners Under The
Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 338, 351 (1961).
55 United States v. Muniz, supra note 48, at 162. Looking to New
York's experience in allowing prisoner suits, the Court found no adverse
effects on either prison regulation or prison discipline.56McNiece & Thornton, The Federal Tort Claims Act And Its Applica-
tion To Military Personnel, 5 VAND. L. REv. 57, 66-67 (1951-52).
5718 U.S.C. §.4042 (1958).
CSSupra note 48. From a sociological viewpoint the relief is important
since "a permanently disabled prisoner with no financial resources cannot
be expected to return to society as a useful and well-behaved person. On
the contrary, he may well revert to crime in an attempt to survive ... "
Note, Denial Of Prisoners' Claims Under The Federal Tort Claims Act,
63 YALE L.J. 418, 425 (1954).
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to construe two paragraphs of decedent's will. In one, the
entire residuary estate was bequeathed to eight named beneficiaries,
one of whom predeceased the testatrix. The following paragraph
provided that "no part of my estate shall go to any except those
hereinbefore mentioned." 1  The Surrogate's Court determined
that the one-eighth share of the deceased residuary legatee had
lapsed and ordered such share distributed as intestate property
to the next of kin of the testatrix, who had not been named in the
will. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the one-eighth share did not pass by way
of intestacy since the intent was manifest that the survivors of
the eight legatees should share the entire residuary estate. In
re Davintne's Estate, 12 N.Y.2d 500, 191 N.E.2d 452, 240
N.Y.S.2d 968 (1963).
The basic issue presented in the Darnnann case, that is, the
method of disposing of a lapsed residuary legacy, was decided
nearly two and a half centuries ago. In the case of Bagwell v.
Dry,2 the surplus of the testator's estate was bequeathed to four
persons equally, but only three survived the testator. The court
concluded that the one-fourth share of the deceased legatee became
void, and since the surviving legatees were only given a fourth
which could not be increased, the void share passed to the next
of kin according to the statute of distribution. This doctrine,
although accepted in later cases,3 did not become "firmly engrafted
on our jurisprudence" 4 until 5 the case of Skrymsher v. Northcoteo
in which the Master of the Rolls pronounced the oft-quoted precept
that there could be no residue of a residue, hereinafter referred
to as the rule.
While the rule is applicable to lapsed residuary gifts, the
courts have rarely hesitated to allow an ineffective specific legacy
to augment the general residuum ; 7 the obvious reason being that
the residuary gift is intended to be a "dragnet that will cover
1In re Dammann's Estate, 12 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 191 N.E.2d 452, 454, 240
N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1963).21 P. Wins. 700, 24 Eng. Rep. 577 (Ch. 1721). For the purpose of
this article no distinction will be made between residuary legacy and
residuary devise, and hence the terms are used interchangeably.3 See, e.g., Page v. Page, 2 P. Wins. 489, 24 Eng. Rep. 828 (Ch.
1728).
4 In the Matter of Bogardus, 5 Misc. 2d 607, 608, 164 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487(Surr. Ct. 1957).
5 1963 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, SECOND REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE
CoMMi'N ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE
LAW OF ESTATES 438.
6 1 Swans. 566, 570, 36 Eng. Rep. 507, 509 (Ch. 1818).
7 See, e.g., Carter v. Board of Educ. of Presbyterian Church, 144 N.Y.
621, 39 N.E. 628 (1895); Schoen v. Siegmund, 119 N.J. Eq. 524, 183 AtI.
292 (1936); 2 JARMAN, WILLS 1021-22 (8th ed. Jennings & Harper 1951).
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every interest not effectively disposed of otherwise." 8 Several
reasons have been advanced why this "dragnet" principle does not
apply to a residuary share which fails. Primarily it is argued that
"one-half of the remainder of an estate each to A and B," could
not possibly be construed as "the whole estate to B if A should
die." The proportion of each is fixed and a court cannot, justifiably,
revise the will." The second contention, given as the underlying
motivation in favor of the rule, stems from the "set policy of
English law . .. to keep the devolution of property in the regular
channels, to the heirs and next of kin, whenever it can be
done." 10
In the United States, as in England, the rule rapidly became
the majority rule, even though suggestions as to its value are
noticeably scarce." The New York courts adopted it because of
their respect for the "authorities." 12 It has been said that the
courts are "forced to realize that as a result of inheritance and
frequent repetition the rule has become too firmly established
to be disregarded." 13
The courts have applied the rule of no residue of a residue
to a great many situations wherein a residuary gift was found to
lapse. Intestacy, however, most commonly results, in spite of the
fact that other residuary legatees survive, when a residuary legatee
predeceases the testator.14
8 Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 457, 173 N.E. 676, 678 (1930); accord,
Owens v. Bank of Glade Spring, 195 Va. 1138, 1151, 81 S.E.2d 565, 573
(1954).
9 1n re Moloney's Estate, 15 N.J. Super. 583,' 586, 83 A.2d 837, 838
(1951); see 6 PAGE, WILLs § 50.18, at 98 (rev. ed. Bowe & Parker 1962).01In re Gray's Estate, 147 Pa. 67, 74-75, 23 Ati. 205, 206 (1892);
accord, Aitken v. Sharp, 93 N.J. Eq. 336, 342, 115 Atl. 912, 915 (1922).
11 See PAGE, op. cit. supra note 9.
12 Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N.Y. 298, 312 (1861); cf. In re Moloney's
Estate, upra note 9, at 588, 83 A.2d at 839.
13 Wright v. Wright, 225 N.Y. 329, 341, 122 N.E. 213, 216 (1919).
14 Hard v. Ashley, 117 N.Y. 606, 616, 23 N.E. 177, 179 (1890); Floyd v.
Barker, 1 Paige's Ch. Rep. 480 (N.Y. 1829); In the Matter of Penrose, 183
Misc. 226, 47 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Surr. Ct. 1944); Dresel v. King, 198 Mass.
546, 85 N.E. 77 (1908). Where the beneficiary dies before probate of the
will, but after the testator, the gift does not lapse. Tillson v. Holloway,
90 Neb. 481, 134 N.W. 232 (1912).
The following cases illustrate other situations resulting in lapse of a
residuary gift:
Wright v. Wright, 225 N.Y. 329, 122 N.E. 213 (1919) (gift to a
charitable corporation which has consolidated with another corporation);
In re Niles' Will, 99 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Surr. Ct. 1950) (charitable gift
exceeding the statutory limit); Booth v. Baptist Church of Christ, 126 N.Y.
215, 245 (1891) (gift held void as suspending the power of alienation);
In re Baumann's Will, 97 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Surr. Ct. 1950) (legatee was a
subscribing witness whose testimony was essential for probate of the will-
see N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW §271); In re Bradbury's Estate, 53 N.Y.S.2d
948 (Surr. Ct. 1945) (residuary legatee rejected the gift); In the Matter
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Notwithstanding the "authorities," the rule has been severely
criticized, whenever it has been considered on its merits,15 primarily
because it is "subversive of the great canon of construction-the
carrying out of the intent of the testator." 16 It is also contrary
to another fundamental doctrine, that intestacy is to be avoided if
possible,17 since the execution of a will is indicative of a desire
to dispose of an entire estate.'8 This is especially true where
a residuary clause is present.19 Furthermore, the argument that
the residuary legatees should not take greater shares than mani-
fested by the will is answered by the following example. Assume
a testator leaves his entire residuary estate to A, B, C, and D
equally, and D predeceases the testator. Since A, B, and C
were to take three-fourths of any part of the estate not otherwise
disposed of, and since D's one-fourth is now undisposed of,
A, B, and C should take three-fourths of D's one-fourth. Now
there is still a fourth of a fourth remaining undisposed of, but
three-fourths of this fourth can again fall into the residuary.
This process can be repeated ad infinitum, and by doing so, the
entire estate, minus a negligible portion can be disposed of by the
residuary clause.2 0
Another criticism of the rule is that, in reality, there should
be no distinction between increasing the residuary legatee's share
because of a failure of a specific legacy and increasing it because
of a failure of a residuary devise.21 The cause of lapse (the
reasons for which are manifold and most likely uncontemplated
by the testator) may be the same in either case and certainly
the effect is equal, in that the remaining residuary legatees' shares
are increased proportionately.
As a result of these criticisms it is doubtful whether the rule
would be adopted today.22  The New York Court of Appeals
has even stated that the reason for the rule "is not very apparent,
satisfactory or convincing." 2 3  Several years later Chief Judge
of Doughty, 24 Misc. 2d 625, 194 N.Y.S2d 50 (Surr. Ct. 1959) (trust
in will held void); In re Waln's Estate, 156 Pa. 194, 27 Atl. 59 (1893)(testator revoked gift and made no other disposition).
15 In re Moloney's Estate, 15 N.J. Super. 583, 586, 83 A2d 837, 839
(1951).
36 Ibid.; accord, In the Matter of Rossiter, 134 Misc. 837, 839, 236 N.Y.
Supp. 443, 447 (Surr. Ct. 1929); In re Zimmerman's Estate, 122 Neb. 812,
814, 241 N.W. 553, 554 (1932).
17In the Matter of Kempe, 191 Misc. 993, 996, 78 N.Y.S2d 830, 832
(Surr. Ct 1948).
18In re Gray's Estate, 147 Pa. 67, 74, 23 At. 205, 206 (1892).
S9 Lamb v. Lamb, 131 N.Y. 227, 234, 30 N.E. 133, 134 (1892).20 Comnmerce Nat'l Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 63-64, 107 N.E.2d
120, 125 (1952).
21 Ibid.22 In re Gray's Estate, supra note 18.
23 Wright v. Wright, 225 N.Y. 329, 340, 122 N.E. 213, 216 (1919).
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Cardozo, speaking for the same court said: "There is indeed a
technical rule, reluctantly enforced by courts when tokens are
not at hand to suggest an opposite intention .... , 24
The courts of several jurisdictions have expressly rejected
the rule and allowed the surviving residuary legatees to share in
the undisposed portion.25  However, it has been indicated by a
small number of courts that only. the legislature has the power
to abrogate the common-law rule,26 and in six states the rule has
in fact been abolished by statute.27  In an attempt to avoid
intestacy where a will has been executed, many of the remaining
states have passed anti-lapse statutes which fall, basically, in one
of three groups: (1) where the beneficiary is a lineal descendant
of the testator, and he dies before the testator leaving lineal
descendants; 28 (2) where -the beneficiary is a relation of the
testator, and he dies leaving lineal descendants who survive the
testator;29 and (3) where the beneficiary, who may or may not
be a relative of the testator, predeceases the testator.3 0  While
these statutes have been held applicable to residuary gifts,81 it is
evident that many contingencies are not provided for because
of their limited scope.
In 1957 a bill was proposed in New York which attempted
to remedy the situation,32 but it was never passed because of
the bill's silence as to disposal of the ineffective legacies.83 Even
though the legislature has been unable to act,3 4 the rule has
24 Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 457, 173 N.E. 676, 678 (1930).
25 Schroeder v. Benz, 9 Ill. 2d 589, 138 N.E.2d 496 (1956); West v.
West, 89 Ind. 529 (1883); Hedges v. Payne, 85 Ind. App. 394, 154 N.E. 293
(1926); Corbett v. Skaggs, 111 Kans. 380, 207 Pac. 819 (1922); Commerce
Nat'l Bank v. Browning, supra note 20.
26 In the Matter of Bogardus, 5 Misc. 2d 607, 608, 164 N.Y.S.2d 485,
487 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In re Moloney's Estate, 15 N.J. Super. 583, 589, 83
A.2d 837, 839 (1951).
27ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §49 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Ky. REV. STAT.
§394.400 (1960) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§3A:3-13, 3A:3-14 (1953) ; OHIo
Ray. ConE ANN. § 2107.52 (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14
(1950); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-20 (1956).
28 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-133 (1956).
29 N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 29; CAL. PROB. CODE § 92; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 731.20 (1956).
30 GA. CODE ANN. § 113-813 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. §64-65 (1949).
31 In the Matter of Mott, 137 Misc. 99, 244 N.Y. Supp. 187 (Surr. Ct.
1930).
32 N.Y. Senate Bill Int. No. 236, Print No. 236; N.Y. Assembly Bill Int.
No. 392, Print No. 392 (1957).
33 1963 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, SEcoND REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE
COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW
OF ESTATES 439.
34 In March, 1963, another bill was proposed (N.Y. Senate Bill Int. No.
2574, Print No. 4586; N.Y. Assembly Bill Int. No. 3898, Print No. 4013
(March, 1963)), which would have abolished the rule. 1963 N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 19, SEcoND REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE
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lost much of its vitality and has been deliberately evaded where
"tokens of a contrary intent" can be found. For instance, if a
gift can be construed as to a class, then there will be no lapse
since the class is not determined until the death of the testator.35
There is also a tendency to seek words implying a gift-over, the
result of which allows the substituted legatee to take.3 6 An intent
that the lapsed residuary legacy should again fall back into the
general residuum will also be respected.37
Another method of circumventing the rule is by applying the
cy pres doctrine, which permits a court in the exercise of its
equitable jurisdiction to substitute one charitable beneficiary for
another which has become unable to take under the will.38 In
their haste to avoid intestacy, courts have found intent where none
in fact existed.3 9
In spite of this aversion for intestacy, mere words of dis-
inheritance are not considered sufficient tokens of intent to prevent
the operation of the rule.40 It is well established that in order to
prevent intestacy there must be a valid disposal of the property.41
A negative intention, no matter how strong or clear, will not
deprive a distributee of his natural right to inherit.4 2
Hence, unless a court can find "tokens of a contrary intent"
or determine that the particular factual situation presents an
exception to the rule, it will be consistently applied.
In the present case the Court places emphasis on the fact
that the paragraph providing "no part of my estate shall go
to any except those hereinbefore mentioned," 43 directly follows
the residuary paragraph of the will. The Court concludes that
MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES 436.
In a personal conversation 'with a representative of the Temporary Com-
mission on Estates, the author learned that the bill had not been passed,
the reasons for this are unavailable as of the date of this publication.
35 In re Long's Estate, 121 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Surr. Ct. 1953) ; In re Dunster,
1 Ch. Div. 103 (Eng. 1909).
36 In the Matter of Friend, 283 N.Y. 200, 28 N.E2d 377 (1940);
In the Matter of Sutton, 150 Misc. 137, 268 N.Y. Supp. 458 (Surr. Ct.
1934).
37 n re Pearsall's Will, 140 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Surr. Ct. 1955) ; In the Matter
of Clonney, 189 Misc. 542, 71 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Aitken v.
Sharp, 93 N.J. Eq. 336, 115 Atl. 912 (1922).3 8 In re Smith's Will, 70 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ; In the Matter of
Walter, 150 Misc. 512, 269 N.Y. Supp. 400 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
9 Roberts v. Trustees of Trust Fund for Town of Tamworth, 96 N.H.
223, 225, 73 A.2d 119, 121 (1950).4 0 1n re Trumble's Will, 199 N.Y. 454, 465, 92 N.E. 1073, 1076 (1910).
4' See, e.g., Gallagher v. Crooks, 132 N.Y. 338, 30 N.E. 746 (1892);
In the Matter of Penrose, 183 Misc. 226, 47 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Surr. Ct.
1944).
42 Gallagher v. Crooks, supra note 41.
43 In re Dammann's Estate, 12 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 191 N.E.2d 452, 454, 240
N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1963).
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the residue should "go to no one outside the list of eight chosen
relatives," 44 since tokens are at hand to suggest this result.
Chief Judge Desmond declared, in answer to the contention that
disinheritance alone will not cut off a rightful heir or distributee:
"but we reach a point where a clearly and unmistakably expressed
negative is as complete and unavoidable a statement of intent
as if cast in the affirmative." -15
In a strong dissent,46 Judge Scileppi emphasized the fact that
words of disinheritance cannot prevent intestacy as long as the
rule of no residue of a residue is applicable. Since such words
leave uncertain who should take under the will, an express gift-
over is required.
Even if the majority opinion is to be construed narrowly,
it is of major importance in two respects. First, there can
be no doubt that the Court of Appeals has acknowledged and
approved of the trend toward an avoidance of the application of
the rule with its concommitant results. This may have the
effect of abolishing the rule for all practical purposes, since a
slight indication of intent would seem sufficient. The simple
declaration by the testator that a paragraph is to be construed
as a residuary clause may be all that is necessary for a lapsed
residuary gift to fall back into the residuum.47  In fact, with
the liberal view the Court has taken, it would not be illogical
to hold that the words "all the rest, residue and remainder"
show an intent to die testate as to all property owned by the
testator at the time of death. Of course, this is in keeping with
many well reasoned lower court decisiorIs 48  as well as with
legislative thought. Secondly, the Court seemed to have adopted
the position taken by Surrogate Wingate in the case of In the
Matter of Weissmnan,49 that the statute of distribution is only a
presumption that one dying intestate would wish his worldly goods
.. . to go to those nearest and presumably dearest by reason of ties of
blood or marriage. . . . Where, however, the decedent has spoken, the
whole fundamental basis for such presumption fails to the extent that it
runs counter to the spoken word; wherefore the result of this rule is to do,
deliberately, the very thing with testator's property which he solemnly
inhibited. [U]nquestionably . . . a clearly expressed negative intention is
entitled to equal weight with a positive one . . . where such negative
44 Ibid.
45 Id. at 507, 191 N.E.2d at 454, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 972.46 Id. at 507-08, 191 N.E.2d at 454-55, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73 (dissenting
opinion).
47 In the Matter of Clonney, 189 Misc. 542, 71 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Surr. Ct.
1947).
48 See notes 37-38, supra.
49 137 Misc. 113, 243 N.Y. Supp. 127 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
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indication of intention is the only one expressed . . . [it] should . . .
prevail over the artificial statutory presumption .... 50
It can be inferred that the Court did, in fact, adopt this view
and hence, the rule that mere words of disinheritance are insufficient
to deprive a distributee of his rightful share would seem to be
no longer the lav in New York. A negative intent can always
be construed as an affirmative command in these circumstances.
For example, the words "I am not unmindful of the fact that
I have other relatives than those hereinbefore referred to . . ."
could be construed as meaning that if the testator wanted those
other relatives to take, he would not have excluded them from
the will. Therefore, testator wanted only those mentioned in
the will to inherit any property that is not otherwise disposed of.
Suppose that testator executed a will naming only one beneficiary,
but expressly disinheriting his son. If the beneficiary died before
the testator, would all the eligible heirs take excluding the son?
Certainly this can be construed as an affirmative disposition, in
case of intestacy, to all the heirs except the son.
The Damatnn case presents new problems which make it
incumbent upon the draftsman of a will to select terms intended
to show testamentary capacity, if they are to be used at all, and
other indicia of intent, which can leave no room for misinterpreta-
tion. And while the Court does not take a definitive position
with respect to the rule of no residue of a residue, it does modify
this harsh common-law rule. In addition, the paramount law of
wills, giving effect to the intent 'of testator, is better served by
allowing a court to honestly seek out intent without being
hindered by strict rules of construction.
50 Id. at 116, 243 N.Y. Supp. at 131. (Emphasis added.)
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